These three Pacific military flashpoints could shape Biden's China strategy
CNN)Any suggestion that the departure of former US President Donald Trump from Washington would provide a temporary pause in US-China tensions has been swiftly dispelled.
In
the short time since President Joe Biden was sworn into office, China
has flown more than two dozen combat aircraft near to the self-ruled
island of Taiwan and passed a law allowing its coast guard to fire on
foreign vessels. Meanwhile, the US Navy has sent an aircraft carrier
strike group into the South China Sea.
Analysts
say such moves are likely only the beginning of what is expected to be a
potentially uneasy initial relationship between the new Biden
administration and Beijing.
"China
often uses a series of 'tests' to determine a competitor's intentions
or willingness to respond to China's actions," said Carl Schuster, a
former director of operations at the US Pacific Command's Joint
Intelligence Center.
Next
steps from Beijing could include large-scale military exercises near
Taiwan or in the South China Sea, or stopping foreign vessels in the
name of enforcing Chinese maritime regulations, Schuster said.
Beijing will be trying to determine where the Biden administration's "red lines" are, added Schuster.
But
incoming Biden Cabinet secretaries have made clear where his
administration will stand on Chinese territorial claims in the
Indo-Pacific.
"I think China is our most challenging, our most significant challenge going forward," new Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told his confirmation hearing last week.
The
Defense Department would focus on convincing China, or any adversary,
that taking on the US military would be "a very bad idea," Austin said.
Here's a look at the three key flashpoints between the two sides:
The South China Sea
China claims almost all of the 1.3 million square mile South China Sea. Since 2014 it has built up tiny reefs and sandbars
into man-made artificial islands, fortified with missiles, runways and
weapons systems -- antagonizing governments with overlapping claims,
including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and
Taiwan.
Washington doesn't recognize those claims and regularly sends US warships and military aircraft through the region.
Part
of the US presence includes freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS),
in which US Navy ships steam within 12 nautical miles -- the limit of a
nation's territorial waters under international law -- of land features
claimed by China, including the Spratly and Paracel islands.
The
US Navy performed 10 such FONOPS in 2020 under the Trump
administration, equaling the record number of FONOPS in 2019, according
to the US Navy's 7th Fleet.
But
the US commitment to freedom of the seas in the South China Sea goes
beyond steaming close to islands, as was shown this week by the
deployment of an aircraft carrier strike group to the region.
It
follows other such high-profile developments in 2020, including the
rare decision to deploy two carrier strike groups for exercises in the
waterway at the same time.
The US also regularly holds drills with allies and partners in the South China Sea.
China
maintains that the presence of American warships elevates tensions in
the region and regards US naval patrols as tantamount to interference in
the country's domestic affairs.
Meanwhile,
Beijing continues to reinforce its own territorial claims, dispatching
combat aircraft to airstrips it has built on remote islands, as well as
upping the frequency of its naval drills.
That
both sides have increased their activity activity in the waterway has
alarmed analysts, who point out that the greater volume of traffic, the
greater the possibility of inadvertent confrontation.
The
US' increased presence in the region is unlikely to change, however.
During his run for the presidency last year, Biden recalled how as vice
president he told Chinese leader Xi Jinping
how the US military would deal with Beijing's self-declared air defense
identification zones in the region. "I said we're going to fly through
them ... We're not going to pay attention."
Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait
Taiwan
returned to the forefront of US-China tensions last weekend when
Beijing sent more than two dozen warplanes into the self-governing
island's air defense identification zone in a 48-hour period.
While
the frequency of such drills has increased in recent years, the timing
and the composition of the latest formations -- mostly fighter jets and
bombers -- appeared intended to send a message to the new administration
in Washington.
Though
the US has remained a decades-long ally of Taiwan following the
island's split from mainland China in the wake of a civil war, American
policymakers have traditionally refrained from overt displays of support
since Washington established formal diplomatic ties with Beijing in
1979.
China
continues to view the self-governing democracy of almost 24 million
people as an inseparable part of its territory, and has vowed to unify
the island with the mainland.
For
decades an uneasy status quo governed cross-strait relations. But in
recent years, under President Xi Jinping, China has reasserted its
perceived claims to the island, threatening military action and even "war" in response to what it considers to be growing calls for formal independence.
Beijing now asserts its military aircraft can operate freely around the island, owing to it being "Chinese airspace."
One
way the US Navy shows its backing for Taipei is by sending warships
through the Taiwan Strait, the 180-kilometer (110-mile) wide body of
water separating the island and the mainland.
US
warships transited the waterway 13 times in 2020, according to the US
7th Fleet. That's only one more than the previous high of 12 in 2016,
the last year of the Barack Obama administration, in which Biden was
vice president.
The
US showed a strong commitment to Taiwan's defense during the Trump
administration by approving the sale of sophisticated military hardware
to Taipei, including F-16 fighter jets, advanced missiles and main
battle tanks, while sending high-level envoys to the island.
Recent
statements from the new Biden administration suggest there will be no
pullback on these actions."There's been a strong and long bipartisan
commitment to Taiwan," new US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told his
confirmation hearing last week. "Part of that commitment is making sure
that Taiwan has the ability to defend itself against aggression. And
that is a commitment that will absolutely endure in a Biden
administration."
After last weekend's Chinese warplane flights, the State Department reaffirmed that.
"We
urge Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure
against Taiwan and instead engage in meaningful dialogue with Taiwan's
democratically elected representatives," spokesman Ned Price said,
adding that US-Taiwan ties are deepening and Washington remains
committed to the island's self-rule.
Japan and a system of alliances and partners
The
US alliance with Japan is arguably its most important. Yokosuka, near
Tokyo, is the headquarters of the US Navy's 7th Fleet, which patrols the
Indo-Pacific, while the island of Okinawa hosts Kadena Air Base,
nicknamed the "Keystone of the Pacific" and home to key US combat
assets, including F-15 fighter jets and P-8A anti-submarine warfare
planes.
The
Japanese Self-Defense Forces represent one of the world's most modern
and professional militaries, and Japanese troops regularly train with
their US counterparts.
Part
of that training last year centered on defending some of Japan's
far-flung island possessions, the most high-profile being the Senkakus,
an uninhabited rocky island chain, 1,200 miles (1,900 kilometers)
southwest of Tokyo.
While
Japan has administered the islands since 1972, China also claims
sovereignty over them. It attempted to assert those claims last year,
deploying coast guard vessels to waters surrounding the islands, which
it calls the Diaoyus, for record lengths of time.
Washington has repeatedly reaffirmed Japan's claims to the islands, however. And in a call with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga on Wednesday, Biden pledged his ongoing commitment to defend the Senkakus under the US-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty.
Biden's comments, while in keeping with existing US policy,
have taken on additional importance in light of newly passed Chinese
legislation, that, in theory, would allow its coast guard ships to fire
on foreign vessels that are perceived as posing a threat to territory
claimed by Beijing.
The
law, which also empowers Chinese coast guard to board and inspect
foreign ships in waters claimed by Beijing, as well as removing
structures in those same waters, has been touted in some sections of
Chinese media as a means of safeguarding China's interests in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu chain.
The impact of the Chinese coast guard law is being felt elsewhere too.
Chinese
coast guard vessels are regularly in the vicinity of
Philippine-controlled islands in the South China Sea that China also
claims as its territory. And on Wednesday, the Philippines issued a diplomatic protest with
Beijing over the controversial new legislation, with Philippine Foreign
Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. describing the law "as a verbal
threat of war to any country that defies the law."
Like
Japan, the US also has a mutual defense treaty with the Philippines,
something that US Secretary of State Blinken reaffirmed in a call with
Locsin on Wednesday.
The
fact that Japan and the Philippines face the same kind of Chinese
threat, while allied with the US, illustrates the web of alliances and
partners Washington has established around the Indo-Pacific.
"The
rise of China and its disruptive impact on the regional order has
pushed the two US allies closer to each other than ever," analyst
Richard Javad Heydarian wrote for the Asia Maritime Transparency
Initiative in 2019.
US,
Japanese and Philippine forces have conducted joint exercises, and the
Philippines last year became Japan's first major military export
customer, signing a deal to buy advanced air surveillance radars.
Other
countries that have been been involved to some degree with the US and,
or Japanese militaries in the past few years include Vietnam, Indonesia,
Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei.
And in 2021, analysts expect the Biden administration to be leaning on that system of alliances.
"Trump
acted and decided quickly, then sought partners. Biden first will seek
partners, then act," said Schuster, now an analyst at Hawaii Pacific
University.
Kurt
Campbell, who will be coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs on the
National Security Council, essentially Biden's point man on the
Indo-Pacific, wrote this month that Washington must work more closely
with allies in the region, including dispersing US forces away from
major bases in Japan and Guam to smaller installations in partner
nations in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.
And help for that US-Japan-led partner system could be coming from European allies too.
Britain has said it will send its HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier strike group to the region sometime this year, and France is expected to participate in US-Japan amphibious drills this year.
Even Germany could become involved, with Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer telling the Sydney Morning Herald that Berlin will send a frigate to patrol the Indo-Pacific in the coming months.
Reasons for optimism
Analysts
note that even while they engage with the US, countries in the region
aren't shutting out Beijing. China is still the world's No. 2 military
power and it is always there, right at their doorsteps.
"One
of the major challenges facing US policy in recent years has been how
to demonstrate that its presence in the region is more than transient,
and that its forces can support allies at the speed of relevance," said
Sidharth Kaushal, research fellow for sea power at the Royal United
Services Institute in London.
"The
broad message of Chinese policy to regional actors has been that the US
Navy may come and go but China is a permanent feature of their security
environment," he said.
Kaushai
said Chinese activities such as harassing fishermen in the South China
Sea or challenging energy and mineral rights tend to diminish when US
forces are active, then ramp up when they leave, "essentially sending
the message to local powers that the Americans won't be available
forever but the Chinese will."
That leaves all the actors involved with a dilemma, said Schuster.
"The challenge is in finding the balance between demonstrating deterrence and commitment, and unnecessary escalation," he said.
"Regional
leaders are happy with the US presence as it serves to check Chinese
behavior. But they want nothing to do with choosing between the two
superpowers," Schuster said.
China, too, has reasons to dial back tensions in 2021.
The
Chinese Communist Party marks its 100th anniversary this year, and it
will be expected to deliver on domestic policy goals -- so foreign
policy confrontations could divert attention and resources, said Timothy
Heath, senior defense researcher at the RAND Corp think tank in
Virginia.
"This provides a strong incentive for China to avoid provocative actions or instigating conflict along its periphery."
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